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Battle of la Drang : ウィキペディア英語版
Battle of Ia Drang

The Battle of Ia Drang was the first major battle between regulars of the United States Army and regulars of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN/NVA) of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The two-part battle took place between November 14 and November 18, 1965, at two landing zones (LZs) west of Plei Me in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam (precisely at the footstep of Chu Pong massif, 25 kilometers west of Pleime)〔Vinh Loc, page 82: ''"their base in the Chu-Pong massif (25 km West of Pleime)"''〕 as part of the U.S. airmobile offensive codenamed Operation Silver Bayonet I (November 9–18, 1965).
In its operational context, the Battle of Ia Drang occurred during the second phase of the three-phase Pleime campaign (Pleime-Chu Pong-Ia Drang). The first phase (19–26 October) was conducted by the ARVN Armored Task Force, the second phase (27 October – 17 November) by the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, and the third phase (18–26 November) by the ARVN Airborne Group.〔Vinh Loc, Preface: ''From the standpoint of employment of joint forces, the Plei Me battle was a classic. The signal successes of the latter phases could, perhaps, never have been realized had it not been for the judgment and foresight of Vietnamese leadership. The initial preparatory effort on the ground, paving the way for the introduction of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, was accomplished by Vietnamese forces. Similarly the very successful final phase exploitation was accomplished largely by the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade.(General Westmoreland).''〕
The battle derives its name from the Drang River which runs through the valley west of Plei Me, where the engagement took place (''Ia'' means "river" in the local Montagnard language). Representing the American forces were elements of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division: the 1/7 AC Battalion, 2/7 AC Battalion and the 2/5 AC Battalion of the 2nd Air Cavalry Brigade of the United States Army, facing elements of the B3 Front of the PAVN (including the 304th Division) and Viet Cong. The battle involved close air support by U.S. Army helicopter gunships and USAF and USN tactical jet aircraft, and a bombing attack by USAF B-52s.
The initial North Vietnamese assault against the landing 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry at LZ X-Ray was repulsed after two days and nights of heavy fighting on November 14–16, with the Americans inflicting heavy losses on North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas. In a follow-up surprise attack on November 17, the North Vietnamese overran the marching column of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1st Battalion's sister unit) near LZ Albany in the most successful ambush against U.S. forces of the war. Both sides suffered heavy casualties; the U.S. had nearly 250 soldiers killed but claimed to have counted about 1,000 North Vietnamese bodies on the battlefield and estimated that more were killed by air strikes and artillery.
The battle was documented in the CBS special report ''Battle of Ia Drang Valley'' by Morley Safer and the critically acclaimed book ''We Were Soldiers Once... And Young'' by Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway. In 2002, Randall Wallace depicted the first part of the battle in the film ''We Were Soldiers'' starring Mel Gibson and Barry Pepper as Moore and Galloway, respectively. Galloway later described Ia Drang as "The battle that convinced Ho Chi Minh he could win"; Ho Chi Minh was the North Vietnamese leader at the time.
==Background==

In 1963 and 1964, a series of political and military mishaps had seriously affected the capabilities of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) main forces in South Vietnam. ARVN commanders were initially under the direct orders from President Ngo Dinh Diem to avoid pitched combat at all costs, which allowed the NLF (VC) forces (known as the Viet Cong or VC) to train and grow without significant opposition, despite losing several leaders to CIA search and destroy squads, which relied heavily on rocket attacks using helicopters. After Diem's overthrow in a 1963 coup, the new military leadership largely consisted of commanders put in place by Diem prior to the coup. They showed equal lack of interest in fighting the NLF, spending their time in a series of coups and counter-coups. In this unstable political climate, the NLF (VC) units were able to mount increasingly larger military operations. At first these were limited to building up larger formations (battalions and regiments), but by late 1964 they had evolved into an all-out war against ARVN units, which they outperformed in every way.
At the end of 1964, Chairman Mao Zedong of the People's Republic of China turned on the green light for the Viet Cong to upgrade attacking forces to division size in its conquest of South Viet Nam. In the meeting dated October 5, 1964, Mao Zedong told Pham Van Dong: "According to Comrade Le Duan, you had the plan to dispatch a division (the South ). Probably you have not dispatched that division yet. When should you dispatch it, the timing is important."〔Vietnam War, 1961–1975, Wilson Center〕 In the Pleime campaign, the PAVN received money, food and equipment supplies, military advisors and signal specialists from China, with the establishment of a Chinese Advisors headquarters in Phnom Penh, Cambodia,
In 1965, the NVA 304th Division received orders to prepare to infiltrate South Vietnam,
By early 1965, the majority of rural South Vietnam was under limited VC control, increasingly supported by Vietnam People's Army (PAVN) regulars from North Vietnam, while ARVN units in the field were hopelessly outclassed and entire units were ambushed and slaughtered. American advisers in the field had long been pushing for the ARVN forces to be "taken over" by U.S. commanders. In addition to actually getting the men to fight (something they generally seemed willing to do when well-led), the U.S. command's better training and leadership were expected to be more than enough to make up for the deficiencies of the ARVN command. The new commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, felt the direct application of U.S. forces was a more appropriate solution; perhaps the ARVN units would not fight, but the same was certainly not true of the U.S. military. By early 1965, Westmoreland had secured the commitment of upward of 300,000 U.S. regulars from Lyndon B. Johnson and a build-up of forces took place in the summer of 1965.
The VC forces were in nominal control of most of the countryside by 1965 and had established military infrastructure in the Central Highlands, to the north-east of the Saigon region. Vietnamese communist forces had operated in this area during the previous decade in the First Indochina War against the French, winning a notable victory at the Battle of Mang Yang Pass in 1954. There were few reliable roads into the area, making it an ideal place for the communist forces to form bases, relatively immune from attack by the generally road-bound ARVN forces. During 1965, large groups of North Vietnamese regulars of the PAVN moved into the area, to conduct offensive operations. Attacks to the south-west from these bases threatened to cut South Vietnam in two. The U.S. command saw this as an ideal area to test new air mobility tactics.
Air mobility called for battalion-sized forces to be delivered, supplied and extracted from an area of action using helicopters. Since the heavy weapons of a normal combined-arms force could not follow, the infantry would be supported by coordinated close air support, artillery and aerial rocket fire, arranged from a distance and directed by local observers. They had been practising these tactics in the U.S. in the new 11th Air Assault Division (Test). The 11th was renamed the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been in South Korea since the Korean War. The 1st Cavalry Division's reflagged units became the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry's colors were transferred to the 11th Air Assault (Test) at Fort Benning, just before deployment overseas.
The division's troopers dubbed themselves the Air Cav and in July 1965 began deploying to Camp Radcliff, An Khê, Vietnam. By November, most of the division's three brigades were ready for operations. It was this US troop build-up that caused B3 Field Front Command to launch earlier (on October 19, 1965) the attack of the Pleime camp which had been planned for December, with only the two 32nd and 33rd Regiments, instead of the planned three regiments (the 66th would only reach the battlefield by mid November), before the Air Cavalry troops were combat ready.
In August 1965, the NVA 304th Division received order to intensify preparation to go to Central Highlands by September:
On October 19, the PAVN attacked the Pleime camp with the 320th and 32nd regiments and on October 26, with the Pleime camp liberated, ARVN II Corps Command requested that "1st Cav TAOR be extended to include the Plei Me area except the camp itself".〔G3Journal/I Field Force Vietnam〕 and be assigned the Long Reach operation〔Vĩnh Lộc, page 101: ''Therefore the decision to organize an enemy pursuit of II Corps Command, in which 1st Air Cavalry Division is the main effort and ARVN Airborne Group is the reserved force ready to intervene when necessary, was wholeheartedly accepted by the entire division, because rarely an unit got the chance to open its first history pages with a trường chinh (Long Reach) operation.''〕 This operation was carried out in three parts: All the Way (1st Brigade, 27 October – 9 November), Silver Bayonet I (3rd Brigade, 9–17 November) and Silver Bayonet II (2nd Brigade, 18–26 November).〔Kinnard, page 1.〕
On November 10, 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade replaced 1st Air Cavalry Brigade and was ordered to perform a diversionary manoeuver by switching the operational direction to the east to entice B3 Field Front to regroup its three regiments in assembly areas, to stage a second attack of Pleime camp set for November 16.〔Kinnard, page 67: ''By this time Field Force Vietnam had asked the division to consider moving this operations east of Pleime〕〔Kinnard, page 73: ''The movement and shift in emphasis from west to east was to further stimulate a forthcoming decision from the NVA division headquarters.''〕
On November 11, intelligence source revealed the disposition of the three NVA regiments: the 66th at vicinity YA9104, the 33rd at YA 940010 and the 32nd at YA 820070.〔McChristian, J2/MACV, page 44.〕 On November 12, the 3rd Brigade was given order to prepare for "an air assault near the foot of the Chu Pongs",〔Coleman, page 196.〕 at , 14 miles (22 km) northwest of Plei Me. On November 13, Colonel Brown met with Lieutenant Colonel Moore and told Moore "to conduct an airmobile assault the following morning."〔Coleman, page 199.〕

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
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